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Highlights  
 
 
1. This paper examines systemic banking crises.  
 
2. We focus on the crisis duration bias 
 
3. We compare multinomial and binomial logit models in correctly predicting crises. 
 
4. We consider a large and heterogeneous dataset. 
 
5. We find the multinomial logit model to outperform binomial models 
 
Abstract 
This paper compares the performance of binomial and multinomial logit models in the 
context of building early warning systems (EWS) for systemic banking crises. We test the 
hypothesis that the predictive performance of binomial logit models is hampered by what we 
define as the crisis duration bias, arising from the decision to either treat crisis years after the 
onset of a crisis as non-crisis years or remove them altogether from the sample. In line with 
our hypothesis, results from a large sample of world economies suggest that i) the 
multinomial logit outperforms the binomial logit model in predicting systemic banking crises, 
and ii) the longer the average duration of the crisis in the sample, the larger the improvement.  
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1. Introduction 
“I see two broad tasks ahead: [...]; 2) Dealing with the longer-term global architecture 
- i.e. …fixing an inadequate regulatory system and developing a reliable early warning and 
response system” (D. Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the IMF, Letter to the G-20 Heads 
of Governments and Institutions, November 9, 2008). 
The recent global financial crisis has stimulated a new wave of policy and academic 
research aimed at developing empirical models able to provide alerts about the risk of the 
onset of a systemic banking crisis, the so-called early warning systems, EWSs (for a review 
of the literature on EWSs see, for example, Gaytan and Johnson, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005; Babecký et al; 2013; and Kauko, 2014). 
The empirical literature on EWSs for systemic banking crises has come up with two 
dominant analytical techniques for predicting signs of banking distress, namely the signals 
approach and the binomial multivariate logit framework. The signals approach, first 
developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and adopted, among others, by Borio and Lowe 
(2002), Borio and Drehmann (2009) and Drehmann and Juselius (2014), considers the impact 
of covariates in isolation and benchmarked against specific threshold values. The fluctuation 
of the covariate beyond a threshold level, chosen to minimize the noise-to-signal ratio, is 
interpreted as a threat to financial stability. The binomial multivariate logit, pioneered by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and used, among others, by Beck et al. (2006), Davis 
and Karim (2008a); Barrell et al. (2010) and Schularick and Taylor (2012), relates a binary 
banking crisis dummy to a vector of explanatory variables to provide estimates of the 
probability of an incoming crisis.  
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In spite of recent attempts to integrate the two approaches to analyze interaction 
effects of macro-financial variables through, for example, the use of the binary classification 
tree technique (Duttagupta and Cashin, 2008; Davis and Karim, 2008b), the literature 
suggests that the empirical strategy based on the estimation of the binomial multivariate logit 
outperforms the signals approach. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), Davis and Karim 
(2008a; 2008b) and Alessi et al., (2015) show that crisis probabilities estimated through the 
binomial multivariate logit exhibit lower type I (missed crises) and type II (false alarms) 
errors than the signals approach and therefore provide a more accurate basis for building an 
EWS.  
While being an interesting step forward in the prediction of banking crises, in 
instances where the crisis is longer than one year the use of the binomial multivariate logit 
model forces the researcher either to treat crisis years other than the first as non-crisis 
observations (Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000; Barell et al, 2010) or to exclude them from the 
sample (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detriagiache, 1998; Beck et al, 2006). However, treating years 
after the crisis as tranquil periods or removing them from the sample implies discarding 
information that is potentially valuable: most macroeconomic and financial indicators 
typically used in empirical EWSs display a different behavior during a prolonged systemic 
crisis relative to both tranquil times and the first year of the crisis.
1
 More formally, ignoring 
such heterogeneous dynamics might give rise to what we call the crisis duration bias, i.e. the 
inability of binomial logit multivariate models to correctly capture the arrival of a crisis when 
the crisis itself lasts more than one year.  
The issue related to the crisis duration bias is not new in the empirical finance 
literature. In the context of currency crises, Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) use a multinomial 
logit model that allows the dependent variable to take three outcomes: (i) the first year crisis 
                                                          
1
 Empirical evidence in support of this claim is reported in Table 1 and will be discussed more at length in the 
next Section. 
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regime, i.e. the outbreak of the crisis; (ii) the crisis regime, for crisis years subsequent to the 
first one; and (iii) the tranquil regime, for all the remaining observations. Their results show 
that multinomial logit models are better suited relative to alternative binomial logit models in 
predicting the arrival of a currency crisis.
2
  
In this paper we build on Caggiano et al. (2014), who show that the above results hold 
for systemic banking crises as well for a sample of low income countries (LICs), and provide, 
to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic analysis of the role played by the duration of 
a systemic banking crisis in affecting the relative ability of multinomial and binomial logit 
models in correctly predicting the arrival of the crisis itself. 
More specifically, we perform two exercises using a large and heterogeneous sample 
of 92 world economies observed between 1982 and 2010. In the first of these, we estimate 
EWSs based on the multinomial logit model and two binomial logit models, one that treats 
crisis years other than the first as tranquil times and one that discards them. The arrival, and 
the duration, of a systemic banking crisis is measured using the classification by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011). A number of commonly used control variables are included as potential 
predictors: measures of broad macroeconomic conditions (GDP per capita, GDP growth, real 
interest rate, inflation rate, depreciation of exchange rate, changes in terms of trade); 
measures of a country’s monetary conditions (M2 to reserves, credit to GDP growth); and 
measures of the banking systems’ structural factors (currency mismatch, liquidity, leverage). 
In the second exercise, we study whether and by how much the duration of the crisis matters 
in forecasting its arrival by estimating the three alternative logit models using subsamples of 
countries built in terms of the average duration of crises they experienced in the observed 
time span. 
                                                          
2
 The authors refer to a post crisis bias in their analysis. 
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Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, using the full sample of world 
economies, we find the multinomial logit model to outperform both alternative binomial 
models in correctly predicting the arrival of the crisis. Not only the multinomial model helps 
better predict the arrival of crisis; it also improves over the number of false alarms, as shown 
by the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (AUROC). Second, 
according to the best selected model specification, we find that the credit to GDP growth rate, 
the ratio of money supply (M2) to reserves, the rate of inflation, and the liquidity position and 
the net open position of the banking system are the best predictors of the arrival of a systemic 
banking crisis. Third, and more importantly given the focus of this paper, our main finding is 
that the performance of the multinomial model, as measured by the AUROC, improves over 
the binomial logit when the average duration of the crisis increases: the longer the average 
duration of crises in the sample, the better the relative performance of the multinomial over 
the two alternative binomial specifications. Further robustness checks show that these results 
hold true for other commonly used definitions of systemic banking crisis, such as Laeven and 
Valencia (2012).  
Our findings have important implications for empirical analyses aimed at building 
EWSs as well as for policy makers. Our results on the role played by the duration of the crisis 
show that multinomial logit models are better equipped to correctly gauge the probability of 
the arrival of a crisis as well as to avoid costly false alarms. From a policy perspective, our 
results show that regulators and policymakers aiming to minimize the overall costs of 
banking crises should target not only the variables that are most correlated with the arrival of 
a crisis but should also act to minimize the impact of macro-financial variables on the 
duration of a crisis. Our empirical evidence shows that the first objective is best achieved by 
keeping inflation under control and allowing for sound domestic and external liquidity 
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conditions, and managing credit booms; the latter, i.e. speeding up recovery from the crisis, is 
better achieved by targeting general macroeconomic conditions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and discusses the 
econometric methodology employed for the empirical analysis. Section 3 shows the empirical 
results obtained from using the full sample of world economies. Section 4 presents the 
subsample analysis and discusses the role played by the average duration of crisis. Section 5 
concludes and draws some policy implications. 
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2. Data and empirical framework 
2.1. Data 
Our sample comprises yearly data for 92 economies observed between 1982 and 
2010. We draw evidence about systemic banking crises from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), 
who define a crisis as systemic if either of the following occurs: (i) bank runs which lead to 
the liquidation or the restructuring of one or more financial institutions, or (ii) in the absence 
of bank runs, the closure, restructuring or large-scale government assistance of one or more 
institutions which marks the beginning of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. 
This classification provides us with 97 systemic crisis episodes in 92 countries between 1982 
and 2010, with an average duration of 4.35 years.
3
  
We select the set of explanatory variables following the relevant literature on EWSs 
(see Kauko, 2014, for a recent review). Accordingly, and given data availability, we use three 
groups of explanatory variables to estimate our EWS: 
Macroeconomic fundamentals: (log) GDP per capita, real GDP growth, changes in 
terms of trade, real interest rate and inflation. Following, among others, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detriagiache (2005) and Davis and Karim (2008a), we include both GDP growth and the 
level of GDP per capita as regressors. The level and growth of output are expected to affect 
the credit quality of the banking system by affecting the ability of borrowers to pay back their 
debt. The variables capture two potentially different channels that might lead to a systemic 
banking crisis. GDP growth is meant to capture the business cycle conditions that are likely 
to anticipate a crisis, as slowed down GDP growth has been shown to be a predictor of an 
incoming crisis. On the other hand, the level of GDP per capita is meant to capture the 
                                                          
3
 We also consider the alternative definition of systemic banking crisis given by Laeven and Valencia (2012), 
who classify systemic crisis based on either of the following measures: (i) deposit runs proxied by a monthly 
percentage decline in deposits in excess of 5 percent; or (ii) the introduction if deposit freezes or blanket 
guarantees; or (iii) liquidity support defined as monetary authorities’ claims on banks of at least 5 percent of 
total deposits. According to this classification, we identify 74 episodes of crises, with average duration equal to 
2.37 years. 
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potentially different transmission channel in countries with different level of income: 
typically, all else being equal, poorer countries are found to be more likely to experience a 
crisis. Similarly, a deterioration in the terms of trade of an economy and high interest rates 
affect debtors’ solvency by weakening their financial viability and capacity to service debt. 
On the other hand, high inflation is associated with macroeconomic instability and impacts 
the real return on assets, discouraging savings and incentivizing borrowing, increasing this 
way the likelihood of experiencing a crisis.  
b) Monetary conditions: broad money (M2) cover of international reserves and 
growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio. The ratio of M2 to official reserves captures the ability of 
the country to withstand a sudden stop and reversal in capital inflows, especially in the 
presence of a currency peg. Therefore, the higher the value for this variable, the higher the 
vulnerability to capital outflows, and hence the probability of incurring a banking crisis. 
Similarly, excessive credit growth can trigger bank problems through a generalized 
deterioration in banks’ asset quality (as a result of over-indebtedness of borrowers and 
loosening credit standards) and/or a reduction in liquidity (due to aggressive maturity 
transformation and reliance on wholesale sources of funding). Accordingly, the probability of 
a crisis is expected to increase when credit grows too fast. We use growth of the credit-to-
GDP ratio instead of growth of real credit due to data availability and practical implications. 
The credit-to-GDP ratio has been adopted as a common reference point under Basel III to 
guide the build-up of countercyclical capital buffers (BCBS, 2010; Drehmann et al., 2011).  
c) Banking system structural factors: foreign exchange (FX) net open position and 
liquidity position. A negative FX net open position is a signal of currency mismatch between 
the value of banks’ assets and liabilities, which exposes banks to potentially substantial losses 
in the event the domestic currency depreciates, especially for developing economies. The 
liquidity position of the banking system is proxied by the ratio of private credit to deposits. 
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The higher the ratio, the lower the capacity of the banking system to withstand deposit 
withdrawals or the inability to rollover short-term debt in wholesale markets, hence a positive 
relation with the likelihood of a crisis is expected.  
Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables and their sources. 
2.2. The crisis duration bias 
As discussed, binomial multivariate logit models have become the benchmark 
empirical framework for building EWSs since the seminal work by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998). When binomial EWSs are of interest, the dependent variable takes the 
form of a two-outcome dummy variable, with the value of 1 denoting the first year of a 
systemic banking crisis, and the value of 0 denoting all remaining observations. Hence, in a 
binomial logit framework, crisis years other than the first are either treated as normal (non-
crisis) times or discarded from the sample. In both cases, potentially valuable information is 
not taken into account when estimating EWSs, particularly if the proportion of post-crisis 
observations is not negligible. In the context of currency crises this phenomenon is known as 
the post-crisis bias: after the onset of the crisis, economic variables do not go back 
immediately to “normal”, i.e. to the pre-crisis steady-state level, but take time to converge to 
equilibrium. In order to account for such a different behavior, transition periods where the 
economy recovers from the crisis are explicitly modeled in a multinomial logit framework. 
The issue of post-crisis bias, and the use of multinomial logit models to deal with it, has been 
considered in the empirical literature on currency crises (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006).  
In the context of systemic banking crises, the existence of a similar bias is even more 
likely to be present. On the one hand, banking crises are more persistent than currency crises 
as they tend to last longer (Babecký et al, 2013). On the other hand, due to the credit crunch 
and the generalized loss of confidence that typically accompany a banking crisis, economic 
recovery takes longer than after a currency crisis (Frydl, 1999), disproportionately affecting 
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those sectors of the economy which are heavily dependent on bank finance (Kroszner et al., 
2007; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2007). Put differently, since banking crises are typically long-
lasting, in the periods following the onset of the crisis the economy is likely to be still in a 
state of crisis, and hence relevant economic variables behave differently from both 
“equilibrium” periods and the outbreak of a crisis. We call crisis duration bias this 
phenomenon related to the existence of a state of prolonged distress in the context of banking 
crises: not accounting for the existence of a third state in the economy, i.e., a period of 
adjustment after the outbreak of a banking crisis before going back to normal, might reduce 
the predictive power the estimated EWS (see Caggiano et al., 2014, for an analysis of the 
crisis duration bias in a sample of LICs). 
The existence of three scenarios – “normal” times, the first year of crisis, and the 
crisis years after the first – that are likely to be significantly different from each other in our 
sample of economies is strongly supported by the preliminary evidence we report in Table 1. 
The Table presents the average values of our independent variables for all years (column 2); 
when the crisis occurs (column 3); in the combined tranquil periods and crisis years (column 
4); in tranquil times (column 5) and in crisis years other than the first (column 6). 
Comparison of columns (5) and (6) suggests that, when the economy is in a prolonged state 
of crisis, its behavior is different compared to tranquil times. More formally, as reported in 
Column (7), the null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected for all but two of our control 
variables, supporting the hypothesis that these periods, i.e. the post-crisis adjustment period 
and tranquil times, should be treated differently when building the EWS. The descriptive 
evidence reported in Table 1 suggest that mixing up information about tranquil times and 
post-crisis periods (as in column 4) is likely to be misleading and that it might lead to a 
potential crisis duration bias. The same suggestive evidence holds if the Laeven and Valencia 
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(2012) classification of banking crisis is adopted. We take the evidence of Table 1 as a 
rationale for the use of models that explicitly account for a post-crisis state.  
2.3. The multinomial logit model 
In building the EWS for predicting systemic banking crises, we consider the 
multinomial logit model, previously employed by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) in the 
context of currency crises and by Caggiano et al. (2014) in the context of banking crises in 
LICs, as an alternative to the commonly used binomial models previously discussed. The 
estimated model returns a predicted measure of fragility of the banking sector, i.e. the 
estimated probability of a crisis, as a function of a vector of potential explanatory variables.
4
 
More formally, we assume that each economy i=1,…,n can be in one of the following 
j+1=3 states: tranquil period (j=0), first year of crisis (j=1), or crisis years other than the first 
(j=2). The probability that an economy is in state j is given by 
(1)               
 
  
     
      
      
   
,           
where      is the vector of regressors of dimension k and β is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The log-likelihood function to be maximized is 
(2)                       
 
   
 
    
where dij=1 if the economy i is in state j.  
We set the tranquil regime as the base outcome in order to provide identification for 
the multinomial logit model, which gives the following J=2 log-odds ratio:  
                                                          
4
 When using panel data, country fixed effects are often included in the empirical model to allow for the 
possibility that the dependent variable may change cross-country independently of the explanatory variables 
included in the regression. In logit estimations, including country fixed effects would require omitting from the 
panel all countries that did not experience a banking crisis during the period under consideration (Greene, 2011). 
This would imply disregarding a large amount of information. Moreover, limiting the panel to countries with 
crises only would produce a biased sample. Therefore estimating the model without fixed effects is usually the 
preferable approach. 
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(3) 
          
          
    
      and 
(4)  
          
          
    
     . 
The vector of parameters β1 measures the effect of a change in the independent 
variables      on the probability of entering a systemic banking crisis relative to the 
probability of being in tranquil times. Accordingly, β2 measures the effect of a change in the 
independent variable      on the probability of remaining in a state of crisis relative to the 
probability of being in tranquil times. Eq. (2) is a generalization of the log-likelihood for the 
binomial logit model, where only two states are allowed, i.e. Pr(Yt=2)=0.
5
  
However, one caveat is in order. Although the multinomial logit model classifies 
observations into multiple states (three in our case), it nonetheless rests on a questionable 
assumption, i.e. that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) holds.
6
 In the next 
section, we provide evidence for its validity based on the Hausman and McFadden (1984) 
test.
7
 
3. Empirical results  
We begin by estimating our multinomial logit using the full sample at hand, and by 
including all selected regressors. As in Barrell et al (2010), we adopt the general-to-specific 
approach to obtain the final specification of the empirical model. 
Results about the estimated probability of entering a crisis compared to being in 
tranquil times coming from our final specification are summarized in column (1) of Table 2. 
As the Table shows, we find that the banking system credit-to-deposit ratio and FX net open 
                                                          
5
 Given that the focus of our study is on building a EWS, we lag all variables by one year. This also helps deal 
with potential endogeneity of regressors. 
6
 The Indipendence of Irrelevant Alternatives hypothesis maintains that the characteristics of a given choice 
alternative have no impact on the probability of choosing other alternatives. 
7
 The Hausman and McFadden test rests on the estimation of two multinomial logit models, one based on the 
full set of alternatives (all three states in our case) and the other based on a subset of these alternatives, and the 
subsamples with choices from this subset (states “0”, i.e. tranquil times, and “1”, first year of crisis, in our case. 
The IIA holds if the estimated parameters from the two models are not statistically different. Under the null 
hypothesis that the IIA holds, the test has a chi-square distribution. 
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position, the rate of inflation, the change in credit as a fraction of GDP, and the M2 reserves 
to GDP ratio are all positively correlated with the probability of experiencing a systemic 
banking crisis. Unsurprisingly, these results are in line with previous studies focusing on 
heterogeneous samples such as ours, i.e. including both advanced and developing economies 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 2000; 2002; Beck et al., 2006; Davis and Karim, 
2008a). Hence, in terms of early warning for policy makers, our results indicate that banking 
systems that one year prior to the crisis engage in excessive credit activity relative to the 
deposit base are more likely to experience a systemic crisis. In addition to liquidity risk, 
external vulnerabilities as proxied by the ratio of M2 to reserves and banking system 
exposure to FX risk significantly increase the probability of experiencing systemic financial 
distress as do excessive credit growth and monetary instability. It is important to notice that 
the Hausman test for the IIA hypothesis reads 2.170, which leads to not rejecting at any 
standard significance level the null hypothesis that the IIA holds.  
The multinomial model also provides an indication of which factors are more likely to 
drive the economy into a prolonged period of crisis. The results, i.e. the estimated probability 
of experiencing a crisis lasting more than one year compared to being in a no-crisis period, 
are shown in column (2) of Table 2. Interestingly, some variables which are not associated 
with the arrival of a crisis become significant in explaining the permanence in a state of 
crisis, while others change their signs or the intensity of the coefficients. Again, the results 
are intuitively convincing and are as expected. In particular, the level and growth of 
economic activity usually deteriorate after the onset of systemic banking crisis, contributing 
to a longer period of distress, as shown by the statistically significant negative sign associated 
with GDP per capita and GDP growth, while credit activity typically diminishes following 
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the arrival of a crisis, hence a statistically significant negative coefficient for the rate of 
growth of credit-to-GDP.
8
 
The second step in our empirical strategy is to estimate the binomial logit models 
where the observations related to crisis years other than the first are (i) treated as non-crisis 
observations (Table 3) and (ii) discarded from the sample (Table 4). In both cases, the results 
about the determinants of the arrival of a systemic banking crisis point to very similar 
conclusions to those coming from the multinomial logit model, the only exception being the 
net open position in the binomial model where crisis observations other than the first are 
removed from the sample, which is no longer significant. 
Next, we move to the main question of our empirical analysis: How good is the in-
sample performance of the multinomial logit relative to the more commonly used binomial 
logit model? Assessing the goodness-of-fit of alternative EWSs can be done by looking at the 
rate of True Positives (TP) and False Positives (FP) they generate, i.e. the percentage of 
correctly called crises and the percentage of false alarms. In particular, we look at the 
AUROC. The ROC curve plots the rate of true positive against the rate of false positive 
generated by a binary classification model as its discrimination threshold is varied. The 
AUROC is then a measure of the signalling quality of the estimated EWS, which overcomes 
the problem of assuming a specific utility function for the policy maker in order to properly 
weight the costs associated to a given signal (see Hsieh and Turnbull,1996, and Peterson, 
2013, for a general discussion of the AUROC; Drehmann and Juselius, 2013, and Caggiano 
et al., 2014, for an application to banking crises). A value of the AUROC equal to 0.5 refers 
                                                          
8
 In order to capture the impact of the long run trend of money upon the probability of experiencing a banking 
crisis, we have expanded the set of regressors to include a measure of excess money. For each economy, we 
have estimated excess money as log(M2/GDP_deflator)-b0-b1*log(GDP_level)-b2*interest_rate. We have then 
added excess money and its cubed value to the set of regressors. Results show that the variable in level is 
statistically significant only marginally (at the 10% level) in predicting the arrival of the crisis, though it does 
not help in predicting the duration of the crisis. The cubed value is never statistically significant. Results, not 
shown in the paper, are available upon request.  
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to a completely uninformative signal, e.g. tossing a coin, while a value equal to 1 refers to a 
perfectly informative signal. 
Estimates of the percentages of crises correctly called, of false alarms and AUROC 
for our multinomial logit model are reported in Table 5. The top panel of Table 5 reports the 
results for our baseline definition of systemic banking crisis, i.e. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
The bottom panel of the Table reports the same results for the alternative crisis definition we 
consider, i.e. Laeven and Valencia (2012). For our baseline definition of crisis, the 
multinomial logit outperforms both binomial models. In particular, as reported in column (1), 
for the multinomial model we get a value of 0.5670 of TP, 0.2447 of FN and a value of the 
AUROC equal to 0.7338. Columns (2) and (4) report the same values for the binomial logit 
where the crisis years are treated as normal times (column (2)) and where they are dropped 
from the sample (column (4)). Column (3) and (5) report the percentage difference between 
the two binomial logit models and the multinomial. As the Table shows, the multinomial 
model has a better performance relative to both specifications of the binomial logit models, 
with a relative improvement in the AUROC of 3.9 percent and 1.7 percent respectively.  
4. Subsample analysis and crisis duration 
The previous section shows that, in a large sample of world economies with average 
duration of systemic banking crisis longer than one year, multinomial logit models are better 
equipped than commonly used binomial logit specifications to build up EWSs. But is the 
superior performance of multinomial logit models relative to binomial models a function of 
the duration of the crises or is it due to other, unspecified factors?  
To dig deeper into the relation between the duration of crises and the relative 
performance of different logit specifications, we perform the following exercise. We rank the 
92 countries included in our sample according to the average duration of systemic banking 
crises they have experienced in the observed time span. We then split the full sample of 
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countries into four groups. Group A comprises of 32 countries that have never experienced a 
crisis in the observed sample or have experienced a one year duration banking crisis; the 
other three groups (Group B, C and D) include 20 countries each, which are ranked according 
to the average duration of crisis, so that Group B includes the 20 countries that have 
experienced at least one crisis with the lowest average duration, and group D including the 20 
countries that have experienced at least one crisis with the highest average duration (group C 
includes the middle countries in terms of crisis duration).  
Table 6 reports details about the number of observations and the average duration of 
crisis for each group, and for each definition of banking crisis employed in the empirical 
analysis. Details on the specific countries included in each group are provided in Appendix B. 
Based on these groups, we create three subsamples which are subsequently used for 
estimation: i) A+B, ii) A+C, iii) A+D. Each subsamples includes 52 countries, the 32 
countries that never experienced a crisis or experienced a one year crisis plus one of the three 
groups selected according to the average duration of crisis. For each subsample, we compare 
our EWS based on the multinomial logit with the EWS based upon the binomial logit models 
to check whether there is any evidence in favour of what we call the crisis duration bias. 
Evidence of the crisis duration bias would be consistent with a superior performance of the 
multinomial relative to the binomial models increasing with the average duration of crisis.  
Table 7 shows the results obtained for each subsample for the Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) definition of systemic banking crisis. As column (2) shows, the AUROC for the 
multinomial increases when the average duration of crisis increases: it moves from 0.7473 in 
a model that uses the subsample A + B, whose average duration of crisis is equal to 1.18 
years, to 0.7708 when the subsample is A + D, whose average duration of crisis is 3.52 years. 
More importantly, the relative performance of the multinomial vis-à-vis the binomial logit 
models turns out to be a positive function of the duration of crisis. This is particularly evident 
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when the binomial logit that treats the post-crisis period as tranquil times is considered: as 
shown in column (4), the relative difference in the AUROC moves from 1.30 percent to 4.99 
percent. This is also true relative to the binomial where the post-crisis observations are 
discarded: the percentage difference in the AUROC moves from 0.31 percent to 1.05 percent. 
Finally, column (7) shows that the binomial logit where the post-crisis observations are 
dropped from the sample improves over the alternative binomial logit specification, and that 
the relative performance is greater the longer the duration of the crisis. A similar pattern 
holds true if we look at both the percentage of correctly called crises and the percentage of 
false alarms. Table 8 shows that these results are robust to the use of the alternative definition 
of banking crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2012).
9
  
Overall, we find evidence in favour of the multinomial logit as a superior empirical 
framework relative to the binomial model in predicting banking crises in countries where 
historically the duration of crises has been long lasting. The rationale is that the multinomial 
model allows accounting for the information content provided by the explanatory variables 
during the crisis years subsequent to the beginning of a crisis, which represents a promising 
way to solve what we call the crisis duration bias. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper compares the performance of alternative logit models for EWS for 
predicting systemic banking crises. Using a panel data set of 92 economies observed during 
the period 1982-2010, we show that the average duration of historically observed systemic 
crises is an important determinant in discriminating among alternative models. In samples 
where the average duration of crisis is relatively long, the multinomial logit model, which 
explicitly distinguishes between first year of the crisis and post-crisis years, improves over 
                                                          
9
 Results are also robust to the use of the systemic banking crisis classifications provided by Caprio et al. (2005) 
and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005). Results, which are not reported for the sake of brevity, are 
available upon request.  
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the more commonly employed binomial logit models. Within the class of binomial logit 
models, discarding the observations that refer to post-crisis periods is empirically superior to 
treating them as tranquil times. 
The main message that arises from this paper, i.e. the average duration of systemic 
crisis matters in determining the relative performance of different logit models, deserves 
further analysis. Specifically, our empirical analysis rests on the use of low frequency, yearly 
data. At least in samples of advanced economies, recent papers have developed EWSs based 
on the binomial logit model using quarterly measures of systemic distress (see Alessi et al., 
2015, for a review of the literature). Compared to yearly data, quarterly observations would 
allow for a more refined analysis of the role played by the duration of crisis in driving our 
conclusions, an analysis that is in our agenda. 
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Table 1 – Averages of independent variables 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable All times
First year of 
crisis
Tranquil 
times and 
crisis years 
after the first
Tranquil 
times
Crisis years 
after the first
Test for 
difference in 
mean                  
(5) vs (6)
Number of observations 2668 97 2571 2269 302
Real GDP growth (-1) 3.54 3.44 3.54 3.77 1.80 8.277***
Log GDP per capita (-1) 7.73 7.83 7.72 7.76 7.47 2.835***
M2 to reserves (-1) 9.68 16.53 9.42 8.73 14.59 -7.079***
Real interest rate (-1) 3.66 4.65 3.62 3.55 4.17 -0.920
Change in terms of trade (-1) 1.35 1.18 1.35 0.86 5.05 -3.714***
Inflation (-1) 11.38 19.23 11.08 10.89 12.50 -1.238
Credit to deposits (-1) 97.38 118.06 96.60 94.00 116.13 -7.747***
Change in credit to GDP (-1) 2.92 6.17 2.80 2.98 1.40 2.007**
Net open position (-1) 9.11 2.41 9.36 10.19 3.08 5.582***
Number of observations 2668 74 2594 2417 177
Real GDP growth (-1) 3.54 2.89 3.56 3.81 0.14 12.261***
Log GDP per capita (-1) 7.73 7.68 7.73 7.73 7.77 -0.298
M2 to reserves (-1) 9.68 18.31 9.43 8.83 17.58 -8.332***
Real interest rate (-1) 3.66 3.31 3.67 3.58 4.84 -1.460
Change in terms of trade (-1) 1.35 1.06 1.35 0.96 6.79 -4.040***
Inflation (-1) 11.38 16.23 11.24 10.55 20.57 -6.001***
Credit to deposits (-1) 97.38 125.65 96.57 95.06 117.24 -6.121***
Change in credit to GDP (-1) 2.92 6.49 2.82 3.02 0.04 2.986***
Net open position (-1) 9.11 3.87 9.25 9.93 0.03 6.136***
Leaven and Valencia (2012): 2.37 years
Average duration of the crisis according to:
Rainhart and Rogoff (2011): 4.35 years
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Table 2 – The multinomial logit model 
 
  
(1) (2)
Variables Initial year of crisis
Crisis years following 
first year crisis
Constant -4.103*** -1.333***
(0.580) (0.305)
Credit to deposits (-1) 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.001)
Change in credit to GDP (-1) 0.017*** -0.013**
(0.007) (0.006)
Inflation (-1) 0.012*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
M2 to reserves (-1) 0.027*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.004)
Net open position (-1) -0.012* -0.008**
(0.006) (0.003)
Real GDP growth (-1) 0.015 -0.106***
(0.028) (0.017)
Log GDP per capita (-1) -0.053 -0.188***
(0.066) (0.040)
Real interest rate (-1) 0.010 0.013***
(0.008) (0.006)
Change in terms of trade (-1) 0.001 0.007**
(0.006) (0.003)
Pseudo-R
2
0.0869
Log-pseudolikelihood -1,229.93
Hausman Test 2.170
(0.994)
We present the coefficients of the multinomial logit regressions. Heteroschedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The multinomial logit probability model estimated in this table is a discrete dependent variable
taking value 0, 1 and 2 for Tranquil, Systemic Banking Crisis and Post Crisis years, respectively,
using the dating approach by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). We estimate:
Pr(Yit = 1,2) = α + β1Real GDP growthi,t-1 + β2Real interest ratei,t-1 + β3Inflationi,t-1 +
β4Depreciationi,t-1 + β5Terms of trade changesi,t-1 + β6M2/reservesi,t-1 + β7Credit-to-GDP growthi,t-1 + 
β8Liquidityi,t-1 + β9Net open positioni,t-1 + ei,t-1.
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Table 3 – The binomial logit model (post crisis treated as tranquil times) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -4.331*** -4.476*** -4.501*** -4.471*** -4.468***
(0.232) (0.264) (0.271) (0.589) (0.585)
Credit to deposits (-1) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Change in credit to GDP (-1) 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Inflation (-1) 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
M2 to reserves (-1) 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Net open position (-1) -0.010* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Real GDP growth (-1) 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Real interest rate (-1) 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log GDP per capita (-1) -0.004 -0.004
(0.064) (0.064)
Change in terms of trade (-1) -0.0004
(0.006)
Pseudo-R
2
0.0600
Log-pseudolikelihood -391.70
We present the coefficients of the binomial logit regressions. Heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
Pr(Yit = 1) = α + β1Real GDP growthi,t-1 + β2Real interest ratei,t-1 + β3Inflationi,t-1 + β4Depreciationi,t-1 + β5Terms of 
trade changesi,t-1 + β6M2/reservesi,t-1 + β7Credit-to-GDP growthi,t-1 + β8Liquidityi,t-1 + β9Net open positioni,t-1 + ei,t-1. 
The binomial logit probability model estimated in this Table is a discrete dependent variable taking value 1 for
Systemic Banking Crisis and 0 otherwise, using the dating approach by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). We estimate:
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Table 4 – The binomial model (post crisis are excluded) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -4.512*** -4.375*** -4.411*** -4.056*** -4.156*** -4.165***
(0.222) (0.246) (0.256) (0.524) (0.588) (0.585)
Credit to deposits (-1) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Change in credit to GDP (-1) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Inflation (-1) 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
M2 to reserves (-1) 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Net open position (-1) -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Real interest rate (-1) 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log GDP per capita (-1) -0.049 -0.044 -0.044
(0.063) (0.065) (0.065)
Real GDP growth (-1) 0.016 0.017
(0.030) (0.030)
Change in terms of trade (-1) 0.001
(0.006)
Pseudo-R
2
0.0707
Log-pseudolikelihood -376.18
We present the coefficients of the binomial logit regressions. Heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation conistent standard
errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Pr(Yit = 1) = α + β1Real GDP growthi,t-1 + β2Real interest ratei,t-1 + β3Inflationi,t-1 + β4Depreciationi,t-1 + β5Terms of trade
changesi,t-1 + β6M2/reservesi,t-1 + β7Credit-to-GDP growthi,t-1 + β8Liquidityi,t-1 + β9Net open positioni,t-1 + ei,t-1.
The binomial logit probability model estimated in this Table is a discrete dependent variable taking value 1 for Systemic 
Banking Crisis and 0 for tranquil times, using the dating approach by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). We estimate:
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Table 5 – Multinomial model vs. binomial models 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EWS based upon: Multinomial
Statistic Statistic
% difference 
from (1)
Statistic
% difference 
from (1)
Number of observations 2,668 2,668 0.00 2,365 12.81
% Correct crisis 0.5670 0.5155 10.00 0.5361 5.77
% False alarms 0.2447 0.2952 -17.13 0.2659 -7.98
Pseudo-R
2
0.0869 0.0600 44.83 0.0707 22.91
AUC 0.7356 0.7061 4.18 0.7217 1.93
Number of observations 2,668 2,668 0.00 2,365 12.81
% Correct crisis 0.6216 0.6081 2.22 0.5811 6.98
% False alarms 0.2413 0.2783 -13.30 0.2715 -11.11
Pseudo-R
2
0.1432 0.0665 115.34 0.0809 77.01
AUC 0.7487 0.7265 3.06 0.7399 1.19
Definition of crisis by:
Rainhart and Rogoff (2011)
Leaven and Valencia (2012)
 substitute 2s
Binomial where 2s Binomial where 0s
are dropped
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Table 6 – Subsamples description 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All times
First year of 
crisis
Tranquil times 
and crisis 
years after the 
first
Tranquil times
Crisis years 
after the first
(a) 928 16 912 906 6 0.305
(b) 580 31 549 502 47 2.583
(c) 580 28 552 465 87 4.083
(d) 580 22 558 396 162 8.675
(a)+(b) 1508 47 1461 1408 53 1.181
(a)+(c) 1508 44 1464 1371 93 1.758
(a)+(d) 1508 38 1470 1302 168 3.524
(a) 928 2 926 926 0 0.063
(b) 580 21 559 533 26 1.750
(c) 580 28 552 495 57 3.083
(d) 580 23 557 463 94 5.250
(a)+(b) 1508 23 1485 1459 26 0.712
(a)+(c) 1508 30 1478 1421 57 1.224
(a)+(d) 1508 25 1483 1389 94 2.058
Subsamples from
Leaven and Valencia (2012)
Rainhart and Rogoff (2011)
Observations
Average 
duration of the 
crisis
Sample
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Table 7 – Subsample analysis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Binomial
comparison
(2) vs (3) (2) vs (5) (3) vs (5)
 % difference  % difference  % difference
(a)+(d) 0.7708 0.7342 4.99 0.7628 1.049 3.895
(a)+(c) 0.7573 0.7446 1.71 0.7540 0.438 1.262
(a)+(b) 0.7473 0.7377 1.30 0.7450 0.309 0.990
(a)+(d) 0.1227 0.0699 75.54 0.0844 45.379 20.744
(a)+(c) 0.0788 0.0499 57.92 0.0599 31.553 20.040
(a)+(b) 0.1367 0.0845 61.78 0.1001 36.563 18.462
(a)+(d) 0.6053 0.5789 4.55 0.5526 9.524 -4.545
(a)+(c) 0.6364 0.6136 3.70 0.6136 3.704 0.000
(a)+(b) 0.6383 0.6383 0.00 0.7045 -9.403 10.379
(a)+(d) 0.2231 0.2680 -16.75 0.2475 -9.847 -7.658
(a)+(c) 0.2558 0.2721 -6.00 0.2564 -0.223 -5.790
(a)+(b) 0.2503 0.2442 2.51 0.2392 4.641 -2.039
% False alarms
AUC
Pseudo-R
2
% Correct crisis
Binomial where 0s
 substitute 2s are dropped
Binomial where 2s 
Multinomial
Statistic Statistic
Sample
Statistic
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Table 8 – Subsample analysis (Laeven and Valencia, 2012) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Binomial
comparison
(2) vs (3) (2) vs (5) (3) vs (5)
 % difference  % difference  % difference
(a)+(d) 0.8253 0.7836 5.322 0.8062 2.369 2.884
(a)+(c) 0.7931 0.7479 6.044 0.7827 1.329 4.653
(a)+(b) 0.7898 0.8097 -2.458 0.8149 -3.080 0.642
(a)+(d) 0.1734 0.1036 67.375 0.1220 42.131 17.761
(a)+(c) 0.1902 0.0906 109.934 0.1174 62.010 29.581
(a)+(b) 0.1998 0.0963 107.477 0.1037 92.671 7.684
(a)+(d) 0.8000 0.7200 11.111 0.7600 5.263 5.556
(a)+(c) 0.6000 0.5667 5.882 0.5667 5.882 0.000
(a)+(b) 0.6522 0.7826 -16.667 0.7391 -11.765 -5.556
(a)+(d) 0.2198 0.2589 -15.104 0.2405 -8.582 -7.135
(a)+(c) 0.2077 0.2388 -13.031 0.2132 -2.587 -10.721
(a)+(b) 0.2424 0.2606 -6.977 0.2351 3.119 -9.790
% False alarms
Statistic Statistic Statistic
AUC
Pseudo-R
2
% Correct crisis
Sample Multinomial
Binomial where 0s Binomial where 2s 
 substitute 2s are dropped
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Appendix A: Description and sources of data 
Variable Data definition Source 
Banking crisis 
In the binomial logit model, 
the variable takes on value 
of 1 if banking distress 
occurs and 0 otherwise. 
In the multinomial logit 
model, the variable takes on 
the value of 1 on the first 
year of the crisis, the value 
of 2 on crisis years other 
than the first, and 0 for all 
other times. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005) 
Caprio et al. (2005) 
GDP growth 
Annual percentage change 
of real GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
GDP per capita Log of real GDP per capita. 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
Inflation 
Annual percentage change 
of the GDP deflator. 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
Terms of trade change 
Rate of change in the terms 
of trade of goods and 
services. 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
M2 / Reserves 
Ratio of M2 to foreign 
exchange reserves of the 
Central Bank. 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
Real interest rate 
Lending interest rate 
adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP 
deflator. 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
Credit-to-GDP growth 
Rate of growth of the ratio 
of real domestic private 
credit to GDP. 
Global Financial 
Development Database 
(World Bank) 
Net open FX position 
Ratio of net foreign assets to 
GDP. 
IMF IFS: line 31N divided 
by GDP 
Liquidity 
Ratio of banking system 
private credit to deposits. 
IMF IFS: 22d divided by 
lines 24 + 25 
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Appendix B: Subsample composition 
 
(A) (B) (C ) (D)
Bahamas, The Algeria Australia Bangladesh
Bahrain Argentina Colombia Burkina Faso
Barbados Austria Cote d'Ivoire Burundi
Belize Belgium Denmark Cameroon
Bhutan Benin Ecuador Central African Republic
Botswana Bolivia Finland Chad
Cape Verde Brazil Ghana China
Cyprus Canada Greece Congo, Rep.
Dominica Chile Ireland Egypt, Arab Rep.
Ethiopia Costa Rica Kenya India
Gabon France Korea, Rep. Italy
Gambia, The Germany Malaysia Japan
Grenada Indonesia Portugal Mexico
Guatemala Mali Senegal Niger
Honduras Morocco Sri Lanka Norway
Israel Netherlands Sweden Philippines
Lesotho Nigeria Togo Sierra Leone
Malawi Panama Tunisia Thailand
Mauritius Singapore Uganda United States
Nepal Switzerland Uruguay Venezuela, RB
New Zealand
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
United Kingdom
Zambia
